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Bibliografiska uppgifter
Huvudupphovsmän:	Ball, Ian, Kattwinkel, Deniz
Materialtyp:	Preprint
Publicerad:	2019
Ämnen:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Länkar:	https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.05556
Taggar:	Lägg till en tagg Inga taggar, Lägg till första taggen!

Liknande verk

Should the Timing of Inspections be Predictable?
av: Ball, Ian, et al.
Publicerad: (2023)

Tight Efficiency Bounds for the Probabilistic Serial and Related Mechanisms
av: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Publicerad: (2025)

Quota Mechanisms: Finite-Sample Optimality and Robustness
av: Ball, Ian, et al.
Publicerad: (2023)

Mechanism Design in Max-Flows
av: Huang, Shengyuan, et al.
Publicerad: (2025)

Robust Mechanism Design with Anonymous Information
av: Tang, Zhihao Gavin, et al.
Publicerad: (2026)

Mechanism Design for Large Language Models
av: Duetting, Paul, et al.
Publicerad: (2023)

Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
av: Ganesh, Aadityan, et al.
Publicerad: (2024)

Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information
av: Balcan, Maria-Florina, et al.
Publicerad: (2023)

Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
av: Chung, Hao, et al.
Publicerad: (2024)

Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination
av: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Publicerad: (2023)

Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information
av: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Publicerad: (2024)

Revenue-Optimal Efficient Mechanism Design with General Type Spaces
av: Prasad, Siddharth, et al.
Publicerad: (2025)

Optimizing Exit Queues for Proof-of-Stake Blockchains: A Mechanism Design Approach
av: Neuder, Michael, et al.
Publicerad: (2024)

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits
av: Dai, Yan, et al.
Publicerad: (2025)

Preplay Losing Contracts: Inducing Strong Nash Equilibrium in the $n$-player Prisoner's Dilemma
av: Fligler, Ian
Publicerad: (2026)

Robust Robustness
av: Ball, Ian, et al.
Publicerad: (2024)

Deterministic Refund Mechanisms
av: Alaei, Saeed, et al.
Publicerad: (2025)

Efficient Mechanisms under Unawareness
av: Pram, Kym, et al.
Publicerad: (2025)

Monotonic Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods
av: Ben-Moshe, Ran, et al.
Publicerad: (2022)

Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
av: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Publicerad: (2022)

Incentive Design with Spillovers
av: Dasaratha, Krishna, et al.
Publicerad: (2024)

Binary Mechanisms under Privacy-Preserving Noise
av: Pourbabaee, Farzad, et al.
Publicerad: (2023)

Ex-Ante Truthful Distribution-Reporting Mechanisms
av: Deng, Xiaotie, et al.
Publicerad: (2025)

An Efficient and Sybil Attack Resistant Voting Mechanism
av: Lenzi, Jeremias
Publicerad: (2024)

Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms
av: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Publicerad: (2024)

Optimal Robust Contract Design
av: Peng, Bo, et al.
Publicerad: (2024)

Contest Design with Threshold Objectives
av: Elkind, Edith, et al.
Publicerad: (2021)

Existence of Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods: An Elementary Proof
av: Hart, Sergiu, et al.
Publicerad: (2026)

Information Design with Elicitation and Strategic Coordination
av: Bonatti, Alessandro, et al.
Publicerad: (2023)

Market Design for Capacity Sharing in Networks
av: Amin, Saurabh, et al.
Publicerad: (2023)

Procurement without Priors: A Simple Mechanism and its Notable Performance
av: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Publicerad: (2025)

Proportionality in Multiple Dimensions to Design Electoral Systems
av: Cembrano, Javier, et al.
Publicerad: (2024)

The Multi-BMBY Mechanism: Proportionality-Preserving and Strategyproof Ownership Restructuring in Private Companies
av: Danino, Gal, et al.
Publicerad: (2023)

Optimal Prize Design in Parallel Rank-order Contests
av: Deng, Xiaotie, et al.
Publicerad: (2025)

On the Equivalence of Synchronous Coordination Game and Asynchronous Coordination Design
av: Pan, Xinnian Kazusa
Publicerad: (2024)

Collusion-proof Auction Design using Side Information
av: Kudva, Sukanya, et al.
Publicerad: (2025)

Fair Allocation in Dynamic Mechanism Design
av: Fallah, Alireza, et al.
Publicerad: (2024)

Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
av: Bikhchandani, Sushil, et al.
Publicerad: (2022)

Price Stability and Improved Buyer Utility with Presentation Design: A Theoretical Study of the Amazon Buy Box
av: Friedler, Ophir, et al.
Publicerad: (2025)

An Isotonic Mechanism for Overlapping Ownership
av: Wu, Jibang, et al.
Publicerad: (2023)