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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Udgivet: |
2020
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| Fag: | |
| Online adgang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.03492 |
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Indholdsfortegnelse:
- We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model trade wars and territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and aggressive (military/tariff) power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. In particular, we derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios. This work is relevant for the ongoing US-China trade war, and the recent Russian capture of Crimea, as well as historical and future conflicts.