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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publicat: |
2020
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| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.08064 |
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| _version_ | 1866915781648842752 |
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| author | Galindo-Silva, Hector |
| author_facet | Galindo-Silva, Hector |
| contents | Ethnic-based political inequality is widespread, yet its underlying drivers remain poorly understood. This paper shows that an ethnic group's relative size is a key correlate of its access to central executive power. Using data on 575 groups across 181 countries from 1946 to 2021, I document a robust inverted-U-shaped relationship: groups of intermediate size are significantly more likely to gain political inclusion than both very small and very large ones. A simple model explains this pattern as the result of elite trade-offs between the risks of conflict from exclusion and the costs of sharing political rents. The model further predicts-and the data confirm-that the inverted-U is most pronounced in countries with historically competitive institutions. These findings offer new insight into the joint role of ethnic composition and institutions in shaping patterns of ethnic political inclusion. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2003_08064 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Ethnic Groups' Access to State Power and Group Size Galindo-Silva, Hector General Economics Economics Ethnic-based political inequality is widespread, yet its underlying drivers remain poorly understood. This paper shows that an ethnic group's relative size is a key correlate of its access to central executive power. Using data on 575 groups across 181 countries from 1946 to 2021, I document a robust inverted-U-shaped relationship: groups of intermediate size are significantly more likely to gain political inclusion than both very small and very large ones. A simple model explains this pattern as the result of elite trade-offs between the risks of conflict from exclusion and the costs of sharing political rents. The model further predicts-and the data confirm-that the inverted-U is most pronounced in countries with historically competitive institutions. These findings offer new insight into the joint role of ethnic composition and institutions in shaping patterns of ethnic political inclusion. |
| title | Ethnic Groups' Access to State Power and Group Size |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.08064 |