Uloženo v:
| Hlavní autoři: | , |
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| Médium: | Preprint |
| Vydáno: |
2020
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| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.10090 |
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Obsah:
- How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.