I tiakina i:
| Ngā kaituhi matua: | , , |
|---|---|
| Hōputu: | Preprint |
| I whakaputaina: |
2022
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| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.08005 |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Tāpirihia he Tūtohu
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
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Rārangi ihirangi:
- Modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are often designed as networked, software-based controller implementations which have been found to be vulnerable to network-level and physical level attacks. A number of research works have proposed CPS-specific attack detection schemes as well as techniques for attack resilient controller design. However, such schemes also incur platform-level overheads. In this regard, some recent works have leveraged the use of skips in control execution to enhance the resilience of a CPS against false data injection (FDI) attacks. In this paper, we provide an analytical discussion on when and how skipping a control execution can improve the resilience of the system against FDI attacks while maintaining the control performance requirement. We also propose a methodology to synthesize such optimal control execution patterns. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has provided any quantitative analysis about the trade-off between attack resilience and control performance for such aperiodic control execution. Finally, we evaluate the proposed method on several safety-critical CPS benchmarks.