:: Library Catalog

Cover Image

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Lin, Tao, Chen, Yiling
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.09721
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Persuading a Behavioral Agent: Approximately Best Responding and Learning
by: Chen, Yiling, et al.
Published: (2023)

Contracting with a Learning Agent
by: Guruganesh, Guru, et al.
Published: (2024)

Welfare, Improvability, and Variance: A Principal-Agent Approach to Optimal Benchmark Item Aggregation
by: Haupt, Andreas, et al.
Published: (2026)

Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands
by: Wu, Jibang, et al.
Published: (2024)

Tell Me Why: Incentivizing Explanations
by: Srinivasan, Siddarth, et al.
Published: (2025)

Efficient Inverse Multiagent Learning
by: Goktas, Denizalp, et al.
Published: (2025)

Nash Convergence of Mean-Based Learning Algorithms in First-Price Auctions
by: Deng, Xiaotie, et al.
Published: (2021)

Paid with Models: Optimal Contract Design for Collaborative Machine Learning
by: Wang, Bingchen, et al.
Published: (2024)

Randomized Truthful Auctions with Learning Agents
by: Aggarwal, Gagan, et al.
Published: (2024)

Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal?
by: Chen, Yurong, et al.
Published: (2024)

Calibeating Made Simple
by: Chen, Yurong, et al.
Published: (2026)

Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions
by: Fu, Hu, et al.
Published: (2025)

No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects
by: Noda, Shunya, et al.
Published: (2024)

The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts
by: Duetting, Paul, et al.
Published: (2025)

Fraud-Proof Revenue Division on Subscription Platforms
by: Ghosh, Abheek, et al.
Published: (2025)

Persuasive Calibration
by: Feng, Yiding, et al.
Published: (2025)

Human strategic decision making in parametrized games
by: Ganzfried, Sam
Published: (2021)

A New Lower Bound for the Random Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade using AI-Guided Evolutionary Search
by: Cai, Yang, et al.
Published: (2026)

Learning to Play Multi-Follower Bayesian Stackelberg Games
by: Personnat, Gerson, et al.
Published: (2025)

Computational Performance of Deep Reinforcement Learning to find Nash Equilibria
by: Graf, Christoph, et al.
Published: (2021)

Computing Equilibrium beyond Unilateral Deviation
by: Liu, Mingyang, et al.
Published: (2026)

Learned Collusion
by: Compte, Olivier
Published: (2023)

Prediction-sharing During Training and Inference
by: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Published: (2024)

Fairness in Repeated Matching: A Maximin Perspective
by: Lim, Eugene, et al.
Published: (2025)

The Price of Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting
by: Teh, Nicholas
Published: (2026)

Multi-agent Adaptive Mechanism Design
by: Han, Qiushi, et al.
Published: (2025)

Fine-Tuning Games: Bargaining and Adaptation for General-Purpose Models
by: Laufer, Benjamin, et al.
Published: (2023)

Human Misperception of Generative-AI Alignment: A Laboratory Experiment
by: He, Kevin, et al.
Published: (2025)

Formal Contracts Mitigate Social Dilemmas in Multi-Agent RL
by: Haupt, Andreas A., et al.
Published: (2022)

Self-Resolving Prediction Markets for Unverifiable Outcomes
by: Srinivasan, Siddarth, et al.
Published: (2023)

Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: Dynamics and Survival of Bayesian vs. No-Regret Learners
by: Easley, David, et al.
Published: (2025)

Deep Learning for Double Auction
by: Liu, Jiayin, et al.
Published: (2025)

Generalized Principal-Agency: Contracts, Information, Games and Beyond
by: Gan, Jiarui, et al.
Published: (2022)

Networked Information Aggregation via Machine Learning
by: Kearns, Michael, et al.
Published: (2025)

Multiplayer Bandit Learning, from Competition to Cooperation
by: Brânzei, Simina, et al.
Published: (2019)

From No-Regret to Strategically Robust Learning in Repeated Auctions
by: Zhao, Junyao
Published: (2026)

The Bounds of Algorithmic Collusion; $Q$-learning, Gradient Learning, and the Folk Theorem
by: Askenazi-Golan, Galit, et al.
Published: (2024)

Artificial Intelligence for Multi-Unit Auction design
by: Khezr, Peyman, et al.
Published: (2024)

Dueling Over Dessert, Mastering the Art of Repeated Cake Cutting
by: Brânzei, Simina, et al.
Published: (2024)

Rational Adversaries and the Maintenance of Fragility: A Game-Theoretic Theory of Rational Stagnation
by: Hirota, Daisuke
Published: (2025)