Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Tabassum, Nawrin, Chow, Ka-Ho, Wang, Xuyu, Zhang, Wenbin, Wu, Yanzhao
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.09430
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866916205540933632
author Tabassum, Nawrin
Chow, Ka-Ho
Wang, Xuyu
Zhang, Wenbin
Wu, Yanzhao
author_facet Tabassum, Nawrin
Chow, Ka-Ho
Wang, Xuyu
Zhang, Wenbin
Wu, Yanzhao
contents Recent studies have revealed severe privacy risks in federated learning, represented by Gradient Leakage Attacks. However, existing studies mainly aim at increasing the privacy attack success rate and overlook the high computation costs for recovering private data, making the privacy attack impractical in real applications. In this study, we examine privacy attacks from the perspective of efficiency and propose a framework for improving the Efficiency of Privacy Attacks in Federated Learning (EPAFL). We make three novel contributions. First, we systematically evaluate the computational costs for representative privacy attacks in federated learning, which exhibits a high potential to optimize efficiency. Second, we propose three early-stopping techniques to effectively reduce the computational costs of these privacy attacks. Third, we perform experiments on benchmark datasets and show that our proposed method can significantly reduce computational costs and maintain comparable attack success rates for state-of-the-art privacy attacks in federated learning. We provide the codes on GitHub at https://github.com/mlsysx/EPAFL.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_09430
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle On the Efficiency of Privacy Attacks in Federated Learning
Tabassum, Nawrin
Chow, Ka-Ho
Wang, Xuyu
Zhang, Wenbin
Wu, Yanzhao
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
Recent studies have revealed severe privacy risks in federated learning, represented by Gradient Leakage Attacks. However, existing studies mainly aim at increasing the privacy attack success rate and overlook the high computation costs for recovering private data, making the privacy attack impractical in real applications. In this study, we examine privacy attacks from the perspective of efficiency and propose a framework for improving the Efficiency of Privacy Attacks in Federated Learning (EPAFL). We make three novel contributions. First, we systematically evaluate the computational costs for representative privacy attacks in federated learning, which exhibits a high potential to optimize efficiency. Second, we propose three early-stopping techniques to effectively reduce the computational costs of these privacy attacks. Third, we perform experiments on benchmark datasets and show that our proposed method can significantly reduce computational costs and maintain comparable attack success rates for state-of-the-art privacy attacks in federated learning. We provide the codes on GitHub at https://github.com/mlsysx/EPAFL.
title On the Efficiency of Privacy Attacks in Federated Learning
topic Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.09430