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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.01607 |
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| _version_ | 1866914236015312896 |
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| author | Hart, Sergiu Nisan, Noam |
| author_facet | Hart, Sergiu Nisan, Noam |
| contents | We provide an elementary proof that revenue-maximizing mechanisms exist in multi-parameter settings whenever the distribution of valuations has finite expectation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_01607 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Existence of Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods: An Elementary Proof Hart, Sergiu Nisan, Noam Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics We provide an elementary proof that revenue-maximizing mechanisms exist in multi-parameter settings whenever the distribution of valuations has finite expectation. |
| title | Existence of Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods: An Elementary Proof |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.01607 |