Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.01607 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Similar Items
Monotonic Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods
by: Ben-Moshe, Ran, et al.
Published: (2022)
by: Ben-Moshe, Ran, et al.
Published: (2022)
The Root of Revenue Continuity
by: Hart, Sergiu, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Hart, Sergiu, et al.
Published: (2025)
Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem
by: Fish, Sara, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Fish, Sara, et al.
Published: (2024)
Does Your Blockchain Need Multidimensional Transaction Fees?
by: Lavee, Nir, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Lavee, Nir, et al.
Published: (2025)
"Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game
by: Foster, Dean P., et al.
Published: (2022)
by: Foster, Dean P., et al.
Published: (2022)
Asynchronous Proportional Response Dynamics in Markets with Adversarial Scheduling
by: Kolumbus, Yoav, et al.
Published: (2023)
by: Kolumbus, Yoav, et al.
Published: (2023)
How to Sell High-Dimensional Data Optimally
by: Li, Andrew, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Li, Andrew, et al.
Published: (2025)
Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent
by: Mishra, Debasis, et al.
Published: (2022)
by: Mishra, Debasis, et al.
Published: (2022)
Optimizing Exit Queues for Proof-of-Stake Blockchains: A Mechanism Design Approach
by: Neuder, Michael, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Neuder, Michael, et al.
Published: (2024)
Shill-Proof Auctions
by: Komo, Andrew, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Komo, Andrew, et al.
Published: (2024)
Existence of Fair Resolute Voting Rules
by: Dhar, Manik, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Dhar, Manik, et al.
Published: (2026)
Revenue-Optimal Efficient Mechanism Design with General Type Spaces
by: Prasad, Siddharth, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Prasad, Siddharth, et al.
Published: (2025)
On the Existence and Complexity of Core-Stable Data Exchanges
by: Song, Jiaxin, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Song, Jiaxin, et al.
Published: (2025)
Automated Market Making for Goods with Perishable Utility
by: Zang, Chengqi, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Zang, Chengqi, et al.
Published: (2025)
Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints
by: Kawase, Yasushi, et al.
Published: (2022)
by: Kawase, Yasushi, et al.
Published: (2022)
The Domain of RSD Characterization by Efficiency, Symmetry, and Strategy-Proofness
by: Zaquen, Maor Ben, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Zaquen, Maor Ben, et al.
Published: (2026)
Networked Digital Public Goods Games with Heterogeneous Players and Convex Costs
by: Cheng, Yukun, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Cheng, Yukun, et al.
Published: (2025)
On Truthful Mechanisms without Pareto-efficiency: Characterizations and Fairness
by: Babaioff, Moshe, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Babaioff, Moshe, et al.
Published: (2024)
Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, Revisited
by: Feng, Yiding, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Feng, Yiding, et al.
Published: (2024)
Optimal grading contests
by: Goel, Sumit
Published: (2022)
by: Goel, Sumit
Published: (2022)
Optimal classification with endogenous behavior
by: Penn, Elizabeth Maggie
Published: (2025)
by: Penn, Elizabeth Maggie
Published: (2025)
Optimal Robust Contract Design
by: Peng, Bo, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Peng, Bo, et al.
Published: (2024)
Proportionality in Multiple Dimensions to Design Electoral Systems
by: Cembrano, Javier, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Cembrano, Javier, et al.
Published: (2024)
Competitive and Revenue-Optimal Pricing with Budgets
by: Finster, Simon, et al.
Published: (2023)
by: Finster, Simon, et al.
Published: (2023)
Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions
by: Cai, Yang, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Cai, Yang, et al.
Published: (2024)
Deterministic Refund Mechanisms
by: Alaei, Saeed, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Alaei, Saeed, et al.
Published: (2025)
Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty
by: Alon, Tal, et al.
Published: (2022)
by: Alon, Tal, et al.
Published: (2022)
Optimal design of lottery with cumulative prospect theory
by: Akiyama, Shunta, et al.
Published: (2022)
by: Akiyama, Shunta, et al.
Published: (2022)
Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2023)
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2023)
Classification in Equilibrium: Structure of Optimal Decision Rules
by: Penn, Elizabeth Maggie, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Penn, Elizabeth Maggie, et al.
Published: (2025)
Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design
by: Ball, Ian, et al.
Published: (2019)
by: Ball, Ian, et al.
Published: (2019)
Efficient Mechanisms under Unawareness
by: Pram, Kym, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Pram, Kym, et al.
Published: (2025)
Mechanism Design in Max-Flows
by: Huang, Shengyuan, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Huang, Shengyuan, et al.
Published: (2025)
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preference Domains
by: Brandt, Felix, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Brandt, Felix, et al.
Published: (2024)
Optimal Prize Design in Parallel Rank-order Contests
by: Deng, Xiaotie, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Deng, Xiaotie, et al.
Published: (2025)
Robust Mechanism Design with Anonymous Information
by: Tang, Zhihao Gavin, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Tang, Zhihao Gavin, et al.
Published: (2026)
Mechanism Design for Large Language Models
by: Duetting, Paul, et al.
Published: (2023)
by: Duetting, Paul, et al.
Published: (2023)
Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
by: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Published: (2022)
by: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Published: (2022)
Binary Mechanisms under Privacy-Preserving Noise
by: Pourbabaee, Farzad, et al.
Published: (2023)
by: Pourbabaee, Farzad, et al.
Published: (2023)
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
by: Ganesh, Aadityan, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Ganesh, Aadityan, et al.
Published: (2024)