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| Главный автор: | |
|---|---|
| Формат: | Preprint |
| Опубликовано: |
2026
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| Предметы: | |
| Online-ссылка: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.13708 |
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Оглавление:
- Symmetry is often treated in philosophy of physics as an interpretive problem. A particularly lively dispute concerns local symmetries: do they indicate surplus structure that ought to be expunged, or are they merely a harmless redundancy? One influential response favours the second option for certain theories -- those dubbed internally sophisticated. And indeed, in much of physics practice, local symmetries are left implicit: one simply works "up to isomorphism'' without pausing over invariance. But not always. In some settings, local symmetry and invariance become pressing practical concerns for physicists. Yet philosophical discussions of sophistication have paid little sustained attention to when, and why, this happens. Surveying textbook general relativity (GR) and gauge theory, I identify the settings in which diffeomorphism invariance or gauge invariance must be handled explicitly. (Here a setting is a choice of representational framework or background assumptions within which one formulates and uses the theory -- for instance, linearisation, an initial-value formulation, or a Hamiltonian $3+1$ formalism.) I propose an operational criterion -- background-relative sophistication (BRS) -- and argue that it accounts well for the pattern: it marks just where symmetry can stay implicit and where it must be made explicit. Quantum and subsystem settings raise a further difficulty: there, certain tasks (superposition and gluing) force symmetry into view even for theories that are BRS.