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| Автор: | |
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| Формат: | Preprint |
| Опубліковано: |
2026
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| Предмети: | |
| Онлайн доступ: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20439 |
| Теги: |
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Зміст:
- The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit complementarities which broadly result in complexities in auction theory. This brief note shows that non-monotonicity in multi-item auctions is not a result of complementarities, and in fact, VCG is revenue non-monotone even in matching markets.