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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Recurso digital |
| Idioma: | |
| Publicado em: |
Zenodo
2025
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| Acesso em linha: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15621449 |
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Sumário:
- <p>This paper introduces a system that motivates effective blocking of false information on social<br>media services. Our team explores how both government and private groups use what they know about<br>misinformation to improve on social media. The approach we recommend motivates platforms to remove<br>false content efficiently, minimising how fake news is spread. We propose a setup that uses economics to<br>ensure all generalised Nash equilibria are used for optimal filtering in the game we design. We show that<br>the mechanism is fair to each player, saves all the resources needed and will lead to at least one final<br>outcome every time. We also demonstrate that, when utilities are quasi-concave and constraints exist, the<br>mechanism creates a generalised Nash equilibrium and produces an outcome that is Pareto optimal. </p>