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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Formato: | Recurso digital |
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Zenodo
2025
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| Acceso en liña: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17764561 |
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Table of Contents:
- <p>In the two preceding articles, we defined knowledge as the representation of the world</p> <p>within the mind. In this paper, we examine the processes through which such</p> <p>representation is constructed and sustained. The discussion is grounded in Piaget’s</p> <p>concept of schema, which in his genetic epistemology constitutes the basic unit of</p> <p>knowledge. We argue that these schemas emerge from the relationship between</p> <p>concepts stored in Quiroga’s neurons, activated through words (signifiers), in</p> <p>accordance with Saussure’s theory of evocation. In this framework, language can be</p> <p>conceived as the set of rules that determine how conceptual neurons are successively</p> <p>activated and interconnected, following grammatical structures and giving rise to</p> <p>thought as the manipulation of schemas. Programming language would thus correspond</p> <p>to Fodor’s (1975) notion of mentalese, conceived around Chomsky’s universal</p> <p>grammar.</p> <p>To describe these processes, we draw on logical and conditional operators common to</p> <p>programming languages, particularly conjunction (AND), disjunction (OR), and the</p> <p>conditional (IF–THEN). In this view, the mental representation of the world occurs</p> <p>through schemas or networks of schemas that articulate the rules governing reality.</p> <p>Piagetian mechanisms of assimilation—understood as the reinforcement of confidence</p> <p>in a given representation—and of disequilibrium and accommodation—as the engine</p> <p>for replacing one representation with a more accurate one—are introduced as</p> <p>explanatory tools.</p> <p>2</p> <p>Finally, Kuhn’s theory is presented to illustrate how the problem of increasing precision</p> <p>in scientific representations is resolved within scientific communities. The process, we</p> <p>argue, is strikingly analogous to Piaget’s account of individual cognitive development.</p> <p>This parallel suggests that both reflect a —possibly unique— mechanism of knowledge</p> <p>improvement: the Hegelian dialectic.</p>