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| Format: | Recurso digital |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Zenodo
2023
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17812236 |
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Inhaltsangabe:
- <p><span>In this paper, the Kantian concept of apriority is explored. The notion occupies a central position in Kant’s epistemological project of necessity and reason. The concept of apriority rests fundamentally upon the principle of containment. This paper examines the concept of apriority from epistemological perspective. The analytic judgments reflect the concept of apriority. The epistemic significance shows absolute necessity. When a proposition shows an instance to which no counterexample can be given, it is said to exhibit strict apriority. <span>Kantian position is that the notion of apriority is used in connotation with the attainment of knowledge. This knowledge is independent of experience. Kant depicts that a judgment is said to be valid, if it shows absolute necessity and strict universality, without the demand of any human experience. What he is trying to show is the futility of the experience to make a judgment valid. He also shows that empirical judgments never guarantee universality and necessity, in the absence of which they are incapable of making definite criteria of knowledge. This paper also analyses the Relation between analytic and synthetic judgments. </span>The analytic judgments don’t add any value to existing knowledge base. However, they prepare a strong foundation on which our knowledge may be advanced. The main role of apriority is the construction of concepts which serves as a precursor for synthetic judgments. In mathematical axioms the definitions create the concepts. Hence, these concepts show absolute necessity. Kant’s greatest contribution is to show that synthetic judgments are possible against the background of absolute necessity; which is available to us a priori.</span></p>