Sommario:
  • <h2><strong>Article Review</strong></h2> <h3><strong>Andrés Miguel Cosialls Ubach, <em>“The Protection of Animals in Armed Conflicts”</em></strong></h3> <p>In <em>The Protection of Animals in Armed Conflicts</em>, <strong>Andrés Miguel Cosialls Ubach</strong> offers a highly original and methodologically rigorous contribution to International Humanitarian Law by addressing a subject traditionally relegated to the margins of the law of armed conflict: the <strong>legal status and protection of animals during hostilities</strong>. The article advances a sophisticated doctrinal argument that situates animal protection not as a peripheral ethical concern, but as a <strong>structural component of civilian protection, environmental integrity, and humanitarian resilience in contemporary warfare</strong>.</p> <p>The article’s foundational contribution lies in its rejection of the reductionist view of animals as mere collateral victims of war. Instead, Cosialls Ubach demonstrates that animals—both domestic and wild—are <strong>integral elements of socio-ecological systems</strong>, whose destruction generates cascading humanitarian, economic, and environmental harm. In conflicts marked by protracted violence and governance collapse, animals become simultaneously <strong>targets, tools, and victims</strong>, with direct consequences for food security, displacement, public health, and ecosystem stability.</p> <p>This analytical shift aligns the article with emerging approaches in IHL that emphasize <strong>systemic and cumulative harm</strong>, rather than isolated acts of destruction.</p> <p>A central doctrinal axis of the article is the examination of animals within the classical IHL category of <strong>“objects” or “property”</strong>, inherited from the Hague Regulations and the traditional patrimonial logic of warfare. While acknowledging that animals have historically been treated as enemy property subject to capture or destruction under military necessity, the author convincingly demonstrates the <strong>inadequacy of this framework</strong> in light of contemporary legal, ethical, and ecological developments.</p> <p>Particularly compelling is the analysis of animals—especially livestock—as <strong>objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population</strong>, explicitly referenced in Article 54(2) of Additional Protocol I. The deliberate destruction of herds in pastoral or agrarian societies is shown to be functionally equivalent to the destruction of crops or water infrastructure, placing such conduct at the threshold of <strong>absolute prohibition</strong>, irrespective of claims of military necessity.</p> <p>The article provides a nuanced critique of how animals are treated within <strong>targeting law and proportionality assessments</strong>. While animal death is often dismissed as legally insignificant incidental damage, Cosialls Ubach demonstrates that this approach fails when the loss of animals directly undermines civilian survival. In such contexts, animals cease to be neutral objects and become <strong>legally relevant components of the proportionality calculus</strong>, particularly where their destruction precipitates famine, forced displacement, or environmental collapse.</p> <p>This reasoning reflects an evolution toward an <strong>effects-based interpretation of IHL</strong>, consistent with contemporary jurisprudence and humanitarian practice.</p> <p>One of the article’s most innovative sections concerns the <strong>instrumentalization of animals as means or methods of warfare</strong>. From detection dogs and pack animals to marine mammals and, more controversially, animals used as explosive vectors, the author explores the profound legal tensions generated by the use of living beings as military instruments.</p> <p>The article persuasively argues that while animals cannot be classified as combatants, their active participation in hostilities exposes them to lawful attack, creating an ethical and legal paradox. The discussion of <strong>Article 36 weapons reviews</strong> is particularly valuable, raising the question of whether the training and deployment of animals for hostile purposes should be subject to legal review analogous to that required for new weapons systems, given their inherent unpredictability and potential for indiscriminate effects.</p> <p>The treatment of <strong>captured animals</strong> reveals a structural gap in IHL. As animals cannot qualify as prisoners of war, they fall outside the protective regimes of the Geneva Conventions. Nonetheless, Cosialls Ubach demonstrates that the <strong>principle of humanity</strong>, read together with prohibitions on unnecessary suffering and wanton destruction, imposes minimum obligations of care and restraint on the capturing party. This argument avoids anthropomorphism while grounding animal protection firmly within existing IHL principles.</p> <p>The article’s most forward-looking contribution lies in its exploration of <strong>enhanced protection regimes</strong>. Cosialls Ubach shows how animals may benefit indirectly from legal categories such as:</p> <ul> <li> <p><strong>Objects indispensable to civilian survival</strong>,</p> </li> <li> <p><strong>Cultural property</strong>, where animals hold ritual or identity-based significance,</p> </li> <li> <p><strong>Medical and humanitarian means</strong>, when animals are exclusively assigned to medical evacuation, search and rescue, or humanitarian transport, and</p> </li> <li> <p><strong>Protected zones and environmental safeguards</strong>, linking animal protection to the prohibition of widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage.</p> </li> </ul> <p>Through a functional and teleological interpretation, the article demonstrates that <strong>robust animal protection is already possible within the existing architecture of IHL</strong>, without the need to recognize animals as legal subjects.</p> <p><em>The Protection of Animals in Armed Conflicts</em> constitutes a <strong>substantial and intellectually ambitious contribution</strong> to contemporary IHL scholarship. Its strength lies in integrating doctrinal analysis, military practice, environmental law, and humanitarian logic into a coherent legal framework. The article will be of particular interest to <strong>international humanitarian lawyers, military legal advisers, environmental law scholars, and policy-makers</strong>, as it convincingly demonstrates that the protection of animals is not an extraneous concern, but a <strong>necessary dimension of civilian protection and sustainable peace in armed conflict</strong>.</p>