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| Format: | Recurso digital |
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Zenodo
2026
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18519100 |
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Table of Contents:
- <p>This paper establishes <strong>standing</strong> as a necessary condition for admissible reasoning in artificial epistemic agents and proves its strict equivalence to admissibility under fail-closed evaluation. It shows that agents lacking standing cannot produce meaningful, reference-grounded claims, regardless of internal coherence, learning capacity, or optimization success. The analysis is necessity-based and exhaustion-driven: all proposed alternatives to standing (probabilistic validation, performance metrics, post-hoc justification, governance overlays, or repair strategies) are shown to fail structurally. No algorithms or construction procedures are provided. The result is a binary boundary on what counts as a legitimate epistemic agent and a foundational constraint on artificial reasoning systems.</p>