保存先:
| 第一著者: | |
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| フォーマット: | Recurso digital |
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| 出版事項: |
Zenodo
2026
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| オンライン･アクセス: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18525385 |
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目次:
- <p>This paper establishes the <strong>Open World Theorem for Inquiry</strong>: even in the presence of maximal closure by exhaustion, <strong>inquiry itself cannot be closed</strong>. While representational regimes, constraint systems, and admissible explanations may be fully closed, the space of admissible questions, measurements, and contingent realizations remains permanently open.</p> <p>The theorem shows that any attempt to close inquiry as such requires illicit scope elevation—treating a closed representational structure as a complete account of reality or of future empirical access. Such attempts collapse standing and erase contingency. Openness of inquiry is therefore not a provisional limitation, but a <strong>structural necessity</strong>.</p> <p>As the capstone of Arc L, this paper integrates the prior results on closure taxonomy, contingency, measurement-class openness, structural novelty, and failure modes into a single boundary statement: <strong>closure and openness are not in tension</strong>. Closure governs what can be said; openness governs what may still be encountered.</p> <p>No constructions, procedures, or operational guidance are introduced. The result is theorem-level, scope-bound, and auditable in principle.</p> <p><strong>Keywords:</strong> open world theorem, inquiry, closure, admissibility, contingency, epistemic boundaries</p>