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| Format: | Recurso digital |
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Zenodo
2026
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18941114 |
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Table of Contents:
- <p><strong>Why do some international crises escalate into war while others remain stable despite similar levels of tension?</strong> This article proposes a formal explanation based on the stability of the <strong>interpretive environment</strong> in which strategic actors evaluate ambiguous signals.</p> <p>Building on previous work on intentional inflation and strategic inference under uncertainty, the paper introduces a dimensionless <strong>escalation index (<span>$R$</span>)</strong>:</p> <div> <div>$$R = \frac{\alpha L q}{1-q}$$</div> </div> <p>Where:</p> <ul> <li> <p><strong><span>$q$</span></strong> represents prior hostility assumptions.</p> </li> <li> <p><strong><span>$\alpha$</span></strong> represents narrative amplification.</p> </li> <li> <p><strong><span>$L$</span></strong> represents the interpretive leverage assigned to observed signals.</p> </li> </ul> <p>The model identifies a <strong>critical threshold</strong> separating two regimes of strategic interpretation. When <span>$R < 1$</span>, ambiguity remains proportionally interpreted and the inferential environment remains stable. When <span>$R > 1$</span>, ambiguous signals are increasingly processed as evidence of concealed hostile intent, producing a self-reinforcing escalation dynamic.</p> <p>The framework bridges insights from misperception theory, signaling theory, and Bayesian inference. Its logic is illustrated through a comparative analysis of three major crises:</p> <ol> <li> <p><strong>The July Crisis of 1914</strong> (<span>$R > 1$</span>: systemic instability).</p> </li> <li> <p><strong>The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962</strong> (<span>$R < 1$</span>: managed discipline).</p> </li> <li> <p><strong>The Iraq War of 2003</strong> (<span>$R > 1$</span>: narrative-driven escalation).</p> </li> </ol> <p>The central implication is that strategic stability depends not only on material capabilities, but also on <strong>inferential discipline</strong>—the ability to resist transforming uncertainty into premature certainty.</p> <p>This preprint is part of a broader research program on strategic inference under uncertainty and accompanies related theoretical, methodological, and replication materials.</p>