Gardado en:
| Autor Principal: | |
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| Formato: | Recurso digital |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
Zenodo
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Acceso en liña: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19025762 |
| Tags: |
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Table of Contents:
- <p>This paper establishes an information-theoretic foundation for social choice and institutional inference under model uncertainty, focusing on environments where strategic actors can manipulate, shift, or distort public evidence.<br>It introduces the friction irrelevance principle, demonstrating geometrically that regulatory interventions based on making strategic manipulation costly—such as compliance burdens, switching penalties, or bureaucratic friction—are provably ineffective against competent adversaries in transparent institutional regimes. The optimal attack on institutional inference requires no movement, falsifying a foundational assumption of regulatory policy.<br>Furthermore, the work proves that friction can be counterproductive: if it constrains an auditor's ability to switch evaluation metrics, it reduces the institution's verification capacity without diminishing the adversary's obfuscation capacity, shifting the system toward failure.<br>The theoretical framework proves a Universal Nyquist Theorem for social choice, defines governing constants such as witness and obfuscation capacities to evaluate institutional robustness, and provides a formal subsumption of Goodhart's Law as a structural property of the probability simplex.<br>This work is applicable to research in social choice theory, mechanism design, robust statistics, and AI alignment.</p>