সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
|---|---|
| বিন্যাস: | Recurso digital |
| ভাষা: | পর্তুগীজ |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Zenodo
2026
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| বিষয়গুলি: | |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19075175 |
| ট্যাগগুলো: |
ট্যাগ যুক্ত করুন
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সূচিপত্রের সারণি:
- <p>This essay examines underprotection in personal insurance markets not as an episodic failure or transitory deviation, but as a stable structural equilibrium. Its central thesis is that the so-called protection gap — the persistent mismatch between actual risk and effective coverage — emerges from the systemic interaction between individual cognitive limitations (operating under decision fog), institutionalized defensive supply, and the absence of incentives aligned with protective sufficiency. Drawing on Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty, the concepts of Nash equilibrium and adverse selection (Akerlof), and behavioral economics applied to intertemporal decision-making, the essay demonstrates that agents acting rationally within their respective contexts collectively produce a persistent outcome of undercoverage. Underprotection stabilizes because no agent in the chain holds a dominant incentive to shift the equilibrium toward sufficiency. The essay concludes that isolated interventions are insufficient as long as the systemic architecture of incentives remains unchanged. It introduces the concept of collective defensive equilibrium as an analytical category to explain the structural persistence of the protection gap.</p>