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Zenodo
2026
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19560921 |
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Table of Contents:
- <p>The companion paper (Beier, 2026d) resolves the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox by introducing track record capital as a second return channel alongside trading profit. The resolution depends on two assumptions the companion paper did not formally establish: that honest disclosure is incentive-compatible in the multi-agent, multi-period setting the mechanism requires, and that the judgment market's return to calibration quality is independent of price efficiency. This paper provides both foundations. Truth-telling about report content is dominant under any strictly proper scoring rule (the classical result, extended here to sequential reporting). The strategic selection problem - agents publishing only where they expect high scores - is addressed through a coverage-adjusted score weighting accuracy at $\alpha$ and coverage at $1-\alpha$. The central result: under any strictly proper scoring rule with bounded range $[0,1]$ and $\alpha < 1/2$, honest comprehensive disclosure strictly dominates all withholding strategies for every agent regardless of calibration quality. The proof uses a worst-case analysis over all possible score profiles and is tight at $\alpha = 1/2$. The judgment market's independence from price efficiency is derived from a principal's delegation problem: the demand for calibrated judgment about future constraint environments is structurally independent of current price informativeness.</p> <p>From the <em>Prolegomena to the Unification of Economics, Computer Science, Mathematics, and </em><em>Physics</em> by Gregory Caldwell Beier (forthcoming 2026).</p> <p>Keywords: mechanism design, incentive compatibility, proper scoring rules, calibration, delegation, judgment market, track record capital</p> <p>JEL Codes: D82, D86, C72, D47, D02</p>