Збережено в:
| Автори: | , |
|---|---|
| Формат: | Recurso digital |
| Мова: | |
| Опубліковано: |
Zenodo
2026
|
| Предмети: | |
| Онлайн доступ: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19600592 |
| Теги: |
Додати тег
Немає тегів, Будьте першим, хто поставить тег для цього запису!
|
Зміст:
- <p>Since Harsanyi’s transformation of games with incomplete information into<br>games with imperfect information, the common prior assumption has occupied<br>the epistemological core of mainstream game theory. However, when participants’<br>cognitive structures undergo endogenous evolution during interaction, the shared<br>measure space required by this assumption becomes operationally unattainable.<br>This paper rigorously distinguishes between the ontological interpretation and the<br>epistemological interpretation of the common prior, and demonstrates that the lat<br>ter cannot be confirmed or achieved by participants through finite interaction under<br>conditions of asynchronous evolution of cognitive algebras. The paper proposes and<br>proves the Incomparability of Interaction Theorem: when one participant refines<br>their event algebra by introducing new concepts, the beliefs of the interacting par<br>ties are no longer defined on comparable probability spaces, and any “common<br>prior” imposed by an external analyst degenerates into a theoretical construct de<br>void of operational significance. Furthermore, the paper reveals a systematic blind<br>spot of classical equilibrium analysis in the face of conceptual innovation—it can<br>characterize optimal responses within a given conceptual space, yet it cannot pre<br>dict the endogenous emergence of new strategic categories. As an alternative, the<br>paper proposes shifting the baseline description of games from shared probability<br>distributions to the coupled evolution of participants’ constraint networks, thereby<br>laying an epistemological foundation for the subsequent development of a theory<br>of structurally open games.</p>