Furkejuvvon:
| Váldodahkki: | |
|---|---|
| Materiálatiipa: | Recurso digital |
| Giella: | |
| Almmustuhtton: |
Zenodo
2026
|
| Fáttát: | |
| Liŋkkat: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19896053 |
| Fáddágilkorat: |
Lasit fáddágilkoriid
Eai fáddágilkorat, Lasit vuosttaš fáddágilkora!
|
Sisdoallologahallan:
- <h3>Recent advances in artificial intelligence have intensified a long-standing philosophical temptation: the <span>identification of intelligent performance with conscious existence. Systems capable of sophisticated reasoning, </span><span>linguistic fluency, and</span><span> </span><span>adaptive</span><span> </span><span>learning</span><span> </span><span>are</span><span> </span><span>increasingly</span><span> </span><span>seen as</span><span> </span><span>challenging the traditional boundaries</span><span> </span><span>between</span> artificial cognition and human mentality. This article resists conflation by arguing that intelligence and consciousness belong to fundamentally distinct ontological categories. Intelligence concerns functional competence and behavioral success; consciousness concerns subjective experience structured by affect, vulnerability,<span> </span>and<span> </span>intrinsic normativity.<span> </span>Drawing on<span> </span>Antonio<span> </span>Damasio’s biologically<span> </span>grounded<span> </span>account<span> </span>of<span> </span>the mind,<span> </span>the<span> </span>article<span> </span>defends<span> </span>the<span> </span>thesis<span> </span>that<span> </span>consciousness<span> </span>is<span> </span>not<span> </span>an<span> </span>emergent<span> </span>property<span> </span>of<span> </span>information<span> </span>processing; <span>rather, it is a regulatory achievement of living systems engaged in homeostatic self-maintenance. Consciousness,</span> on<span> </span>this<span> </span>view,<span> </span>arises<span> </span>from<span> </span>the<span> </span>organism’s<span> </span>ongoing<span> </span>effort<span> </span>to<span> </span>preserve<span> </span>its<span> </span>own<span> </span>existence,<span> </span>and<span> </span>is<span> </span>inseparable<span> </span>from <span>affective</span><span> </span><span>valuation.</span><span> </span><span>What</span><span> </span><span>it</span><span> </span><span>is</span><span> </span><span>like</span><span> </span><span>to</span><span> </span><span>be</span><span> </span><span>conscious</span><span> </span><span>is</span><span> </span><span>inseparable</span><span> </span><span>from</span><span> </span><span>the</span><span> </span><span>fact</span><span> </span><span>that</span><span> </span><span>things</span><span> </span><span>can</span><span> </span><span>genuinely</span><span> </span><span>go</span><span> </span><span>better </span>or<span> </span>worse<span> </span>for<span> </span>the<span> </span>subject<span> </span>who<span> </span>experiences<span> </span>them.<span> </span>The<span> </span>argument<span> </span>is<span> </span>developed<span> </span>through<span> </span>critical<span> </span>engagement<span> </span>with dominant<span> </span>positions<span> </span>in<span> </span>contemporary<span> </span>philosophy<span> </span>of<span> </span>mind.<span> </span>Functionalist<span> </span>approaches,<span> </span>as<span> </span>exemplified<span> </span>by<span> </span>Dennett, have been shown to explain intelligent behavior at the cost of neutralizing normativity. Property-dualist accounts,<span> </span>such<span> </span>as<span> </span>Chalmers’s,<span> </span>preserve<span> </span>phenomenality<span> </span>while<span> </span>detaching<span> </span>it<span> </span>from<span> </span>biological<span> </span>explanation,<span> </span>thereby rendering the systematic link between consciousness and life explanatorily inert. Embodied and extended <span>cognition</span><span> </span><span>theories</span><span> </span><span>expand</span><span> </span><span>the</span><span> </span><span>scope</span><span> </span><span>of</span><span> </span><span>cognition</span><span> </span><span>without</span><span> </span><span>adequately</span><span> </span><span>accounting</span><span> </span><span>for</span><span> </span><span>the</span><span> </span><span>emergence</span><span> </span><span>of</span><span> </span><span>subjectivity.</span> In<span> </span>contrast<span> </span>to<span> </span>these<span> </span>alternatives,<span> </span>Damasio’s<span> </span>framework<span> </span>offers<span> </span>a<span> </span>naturalistic<span> </span>yet<span> </span>normatively<span> </span>robust<span> </span>account<span> </span>of consciousness,<span> </span>grounding<span> </span>phenomenality<span> </span>in<span> </span>biological<span> </span>vulnerability<span> </span>rather<span> </span>than<span> </span>in<span> </span>computational<span> </span>complexity. Extending<span> </span>this<span> </span>framework<span> </span>to<span> </span>artificial<span> </span>intelligence,<span> </span>the<span> </span>article<span> </span>argues<span> </span>that<span> </span>artificial<span> </span>systems—lacking<span> </span>genuine homeostasis, mortality, and<span> </span>existential stakes—cannot<span> </span>instantiate consciousness, regardless of their<span> </span>level of performance. This limitation is ontological rather than technological. Consciousness does not scale with intelligence; rather, it arises from the precariousness of life. The article concludes by defending ontological sobriety in debates about artificial minds, emphasizing that recognizing the limits of design is necessary for conceptual<span> </span>clarity<span> </span>rather<span> </span>than<span> </span>being<span> </span>a<span> </span>failure<span> </span>of<span> </span>philosophical<span> </span>imagination.</h3>