Gardado en:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Recurso digital |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
Zenodo
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Acceso en liña: | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20138635 |
| Tags: |
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Table of Contents:
- <p><em><span>This study examined policy implementation gaps in developing democracies with a focus on bureaucratic politics and corruption. Specifically, the study sought to; examine the role of bureaucratic politics in policy implementation; analyze how corruption influences policy outcomes. The study anchored on Institutional Theory and the Bureaucratic Politics Model, which provide insights into how institutional environments, rules, and internal power struggles within bureaucracies shape policy execution and outcomes. Employing a historical descriptive research design and relying on secondary data sources, the study found that bureaucratic politics distorts policy objectives, causes delays in decision-making, promotes administrative inefficiency, politicizes the bureaucracy, and weakens accountability systems. Similarly, corruption was found to divert public resources, reduce service delivery quality, inflate project costs, undermine institutional integrity, and erode public trust in government. The study recommended amongst others that; Government should implement reforms aimed at reducing the influence of bureaucratic politics on policy implementation by promoting merit-based recruitment, clear job descriptions, and strict adherence to administrative procedures. Decision-making processes should be streamlined to minimize delays in policy execution, while inter-agency coordination mechanisms should be improved to reduce administrative inefficiency and duplication of efforts.</span></em></p>