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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2009
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/0910.3580 |
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| _version_ | 1866916853101625344 |
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| author | Brandt, Felix Harrenstein, Paul |
| author_facet | Brandt, Felix Harrenstein, Paul |
| contents | A common assumption in modern microeconomic theory is that choice should be rationalizable via a binary preference relation, which \citeauthor{Sen71a} showed to be equivalent to two consistency conditions, namely $α$ (contraction) and $γ$ (expansion). Within the context of \emph{social} choice, however, rationalizability and similar notions of consistency have proved to be highly problematic, as witnessed by a range of impossibility results, among which Arrow's is the most prominent. Since choice functions select \emph{sets} of alternatives rather than single alternatives, we propose to rationalize choice functions by preference relations over sets (set-rationalizability). We also introduce two consistency conditions, $\hatα$ and $\hatγ$, which are defined in analogy to $α$ and $γ$, and find that a choice function is set-rationalizable if and only if it satisfies $\hatα$. Moreover, a choice function satisfies $\hatα$ and $\hatγ$ if and only if it is \emph{self-stable}, a new concept based on earlier work by \citeauthor{Dutt88a}. The class of self-stable social choice functions contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions such as the minimal covering set and the essential set. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_0910_3580 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Set-Rationalizable Choice and Self-Stability Brandt, Felix Harrenstein, Paul Multiagent Systems A common assumption in modern microeconomic theory is that choice should be rationalizable via a binary preference relation, which \citeauthor{Sen71a} showed to be equivalent to two consistency conditions, namely $α$ (contraction) and $γ$ (expansion). Within the context of \emph{social} choice, however, rationalizability and similar notions of consistency have proved to be highly problematic, as witnessed by a range of impossibility results, among which Arrow's is the most prominent. Since choice functions select \emph{sets} of alternatives rather than single alternatives, we propose to rationalize choice functions by preference relations over sets (set-rationalizability). We also introduce two consistency conditions, $\hatα$ and $\hatγ$, which are defined in analogy to $α$ and $γ$, and find that a choice function is set-rationalizable if and only if it satisfies $\hatα$. Moreover, a choice function satisfies $\hatα$ and $\hatγ$ if and only if it is \emph{self-stable}, a new concept based on earlier work by \citeauthor{Dutt88a}. The class of self-stable social choice functions contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions such as the minimal covering set and the essential set. |
| title | Set-Rationalizable Choice and Self-Stability |
| topic | Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/0910.3580 |