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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2010
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/1007.3310 |
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Table of Contents:
- We construct a symmetric, simultaneous, deterministic evolution game $SGo$, which is in a certain mathematical sense a symmetrization of the classical board game Go. $SGo$ is in some ways a simpler game than Go, as Komi, Ko and suicide rules are removed. On the other hand it has similar dynamics and move sensitivity, enabled by certain deterministic ``quantum state'' reduction, so that state evolution is deterministic. Using the argument of Nash, we show that $SGo$ has a mixed equilibrium strategy to draw on average.