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Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy? PCP for PPAD and the Inapproximability of Nash

Fuente: arXiv

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali:	Babichenko, Yakov, Papadimitriou, Christos, Rubinstein, Aviad
Natura:	Preprint
Pubblicazione:	2015
Soggetti:	Computational Complexity Computer Science and Game Theory
Accesso online:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Aggiungi Tag Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!

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