Partner selection supported by opaque reputation promotes cooperative behavior
Fuente:
arXiv
Salvato in:
| Autori principali: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2016
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
| _version_ | 1866912541931732992 |
|---|---|
| author | Capraro, Valerio Giardini, Francesca Vilone, Daniele Paolucci, Mario |
| author_facet | Capraro, Valerio Giardini, Francesca Vilone, Daniele Paolucci, Mario |
| contents | Reputation plays a major role in human societies, and it has been proposed as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation. While the majority of previous studies equates reputation with a transparent and complete history of players' past decisions, in real life, reputations are often ambiguous and opaque. Using web-based experiments, we explore the extent to which opaque reputation works in isolating defectors, with and without partner selection opportunities. Our results show that low reputation works as a signal of untrustworthiness, whereas medium or high reputation are not taken into account by participants for orienting their choices. We also find that reputation without partner selection does not promote cooperative behavior; that is, defectors do not turn into cooperators only for the sake of getting a positive reputation. Finally, in a third study, we find that, when reputation is pivotal to selection, then a substantial proportion of would-be-defectors turn into cooperators. Taken together, these results provide insights on the characteristics of reputation and on the way in which humans make use of it when selecting partners but also when knowing that they will be selected. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1610_01993 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Partner selection supported by opaque reputation promotes cooperative behavior Capraro, Valerio Giardini, Francesca Vilone, Daniele Paolucci, Mario Physics and Society Populations and Evolution Reputation plays a major role in human societies, and it has been proposed as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation. While the majority of previous studies equates reputation with a transparent and complete history of players' past decisions, in real life, reputations are often ambiguous and opaque. Using web-based experiments, we explore the extent to which opaque reputation works in isolating defectors, with and without partner selection opportunities. Our results show that low reputation works as a signal of untrustworthiness, whereas medium or high reputation are not taken into account by participants for orienting their choices. We also find that reputation without partner selection does not promote cooperative behavior; that is, defectors do not turn into cooperators only for the sake of getting a positive reputation. Finally, in a third study, we find that, when reputation is pivotal to selection, then a substantial proportion of would-be-defectors turn into cooperators. Taken together, these results provide insights on the characteristics of reputation and on the way in which humans make use of it when selecting partners but also when knowing that they will be selected. |
| title | Partner selection supported by opaque reputation promotes cooperative behavior |
| topic | Physics and Society Populations and Evolution |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.01993 |