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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.09928 |
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| _version_ | 1866912755161759744 |
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| author | Sánchez-Fernández, Luis Elkind, Edith Lackner, Martin Fernández, Norberto Fisteus, Jesús A. Val, Pablo Basanta Skowron, Piotr |
| author_facet | Sánchez-Fernández, Luis Elkind, Edith Lackner, Martin Fernández, Norberto Fisteus, Jesús A. Val, Pablo Basanta Skowron, Piotr |
| contents | The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters' preferences. An important concern in this setting is representation: large groups of voters with cohesive preferences should be adequately represented by the election winners. In an influential paper, Aziz et al. proposed two axioms that aim to capture this idea: justified representation (JR) and its strengthening extended justified representation (EJR). We observe that EJR is incompatible with the highly desirable Perfect Representation (PR) criterion, and propose a relaxation of EJR, which we call Proportional Justified Representation (PJR). PJR is more demanding than JR, but, unlike EJR, it is compatible with PR, as well as with a stronger variant of this axiom, which we term Fractional Perfect Representation (FPR). Moreover, just like EJR, PJR can be used to characterise the classic Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule in the class of weighted PAV rules. On the other hand, we show that EJR provides stronger guarantees with respect to average voter satisfaction than PJR does. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1611_09928 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Proportional Justified Representation Sánchez-Fernández, Luis Elkind, Edith Lackner, Martin Fernández, Norberto Fisteus, Jesús A. Val, Pablo Basanta Skowron, Piotr Computer Science and Game Theory The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters' preferences. An important concern in this setting is representation: large groups of voters with cohesive preferences should be adequately represented by the election winners. In an influential paper, Aziz et al. proposed two axioms that aim to capture this idea: justified representation (JR) and its strengthening extended justified representation (EJR). We observe that EJR is incompatible with the highly desirable Perfect Representation (PR) criterion, and propose a relaxation of EJR, which we call Proportional Justified Representation (PJR). PJR is more demanding than JR, but, unlike EJR, it is compatible with PR, as well as with a stronger variant of this axiom, which we term Fractional Perfect Representation (FPR). Moreover, just like EJR, PJR can be used to characterise the classic Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule in the class of weighted PAV rules. On the other hand, we show that EJR provides stronger guarantees with respect to average voter satisfaction than PJR does. |
| title | Proportional Justified Representation |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.09928 |