The Quantification Horizon Theory of Consciousness

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteur principal: Le, T. R.
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2017
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author Le, T. R.
author_facet Le, T. R.
contents To make nature mathematically tractable, the scientific model of the world omits qualia--colors, sounds, tastes, sensations--leaving only what admits of numerical characterization. The "hard problem" of consciousness--the enigma of why and how physical processing gives rise to felt experience--remains unsolved. The Quantification Horizon Theory of Consciousness (QHT) proposes that this enigma reflects a structural limitation of mathematical description: quantitative models capture only quantifiable features of reality; qualia are left out. Yet despite this limitation, QHT argues that such models can account for the unquantifiable--not by explaining it, but by registering its presence, in the form of a signpost. There are specific features of information geometry--compression singularities--that intuitively correspond to the hallmark properties of consciousness and could serve as precisely such signposts. QHT proposes that these singularities mark a quantification horizon--a boundary beyond which quantitative description cannot reach. On this proposal, qualia lie beyond the horizon. From this basis, the theory derives ineffability, privacy, and subjectivity as structural consequences and proposes structural accounts of unity and causal efficacy. The theory proposes substrate-independent dynamical criteria for determining which systems are plausible candidates for consciousness, avoids panpsychism, makes testable predictions, and offers concrete implications for artificial intelligence and artificial consciousness.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1704_01148
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publishDate 2017
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spellingShingle The Quantification Horizon Theory of Consciousness
Le, T. R.
Neurons and Cognition
Artificial Intelligence
To make nature mathematically tractable, the scientific model of the world omits qualia--colors, sounds, tastes, sensations--leaving only what admits of numerical characterization. The "hard problem" of consciousness--the enigma of why and how physical processing gives rise to felt experience--remains unsolved. The Quantification Horizon Theory of Consciousness (QHT) proposes that this enigma reflects a structural limitation of mathematical description: quantitative models capture only quantifiable features of reality; qualia are left out. Yet despite this limitation, QHT argues that such models can account for the unquantifiable--not by explaining it, but by registering its presence, in the form of a signpost. There are specific features of information geometry--compression singularities--that intuitively correspond to the hallmark properties of consciousness and could serve as precisely such signposts. QHT proposes that these singularities mark a quantification horizon--a boundary beyond which quantitative description cannot reach. On this proposal, qualia lie beyond the horizon. From this basis, the theory derives ineffability, privacy, and subjectivity as structural consequences and proposes structural accounts of unity and causal efficacy. The theory proposes substrate-independent dynamical criteria for determining which systems are plausible candidates for consciousness, avoids panpsychism, makes testable predictions, and offers concrete implications for artificial intelligence and artificial consciousness.
title The Quantification Horizon Theory of Consciousness
topic Neurons and Cognition
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.01148