Arguing from Hazard Analysis in Safety Cases: A Modular Argument Pattern

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Gleirscher, Mario, Carlan, Carmen
Format: Preprint
Published: 2017
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author Gleirscher, Mario
Carlan, Carmen
author_facet Gleirscher, Mario
Carlan, Carmen
contents We observed that safety arguments are prone to stay too abstract, e.g. solutions refer to large packages, argument strategies to complex reasoning steps, contexts and assumptions lack traceability. These issues can reduce the confidence we require of such arguments. In this paper, we investigate the construction of confident arguments from (i) hazard analysis (HA) results and (ii) the design of safety measures, i.e., both used for confidence evaluation. We present an argument pattern integrating three HA techniques, i.e., FTA, FMEA, and STPA, as well as the reactions on the results of these analyses, i.e., safety requirements and design increments. We provide an example of how our pattern can help in argument construction and discuss steps towards using our pattern in formal analysis and computer-assisted construction of safety cases.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1704_03672
institution arXiv
publishDate 2017
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Arguing from Hazard Analysis in Safety Cases: A Modular Argument Pattern
Gleirscher, Mario
Carlan, Carmen
Software Engineering
Systems and Control
We observed that safety arguments are prone to stay too abstract, e.g. solutions refer to large packages, argument strategies to complex reasoning steps, contexts and assumptions lack traceability. These issues can reduce the confidence we require of such arguments. In this paper, we investigate the construction of confident arguments from (i) hazard analysis (HA) results and (ii) the design of safety measures, i.e., both used for confidence evaluation. We present an argument pattern integrating three HA techniques, i.e., FTA, FMEA, and STPA, as well as the reactions on the results of these analyses, i.e., safety requirements and design increments. We provide an example of how our pattern can help in argument construction and discuss steps towards using our pattern in formal analysis and computer-assisted construction of safety cases.
title Arguing from Hazard Analysis in Safety Cases: A Modular Argument Pattern
topic Software Engineering
Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.03672