The Schulze Method of Voting
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteur principal: | |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2018
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| _version_ | 1866915574820372480 |
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| author | Schulze, Markus |
| author_facet | Schulze, Markus |
| contents | We propose a new single-winner election method ("Schulze method") and prove that it satisfies many academic criteria (e.g. monotonicity, reversal symmetry, resolvability, independence of clones, Condorcet criterion, k-consistency, polynomial runtime). We then generalize this method to proportional representation by the single transferable vote ("Schulze STV") and to methods to calculate a proportional ranking ("Schulze proportional ranking"). Furthermore, we propose a generalization of the Condorcet criterion to multi-winner elections. This paper contains a large number of examples to illustrate the proposed methods. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1804_02973 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Schulze Method of Voting Schulze, Markus Computer Science and Game Theory We propose a new single-winner election method ("Schulze method") and prove that it satisfies many academic criteria (e.g. monotonicity, reversal symmetry, resolvability, independence of clones, Condorcet criterion, k-consistency, polynomial runtime). We then generalize this method to proportional representation by the single transferable vote ("Schulze STV") and to methods to calculate a proportional ranking ("Schulze proportional ranking"). Furthermore, we propose a generalization of the Condorcet criterion to multi-winner elections. This paper contains a large number of examples to illustrate the proposed methods. |
| title | The Schulze Method of Voting |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.02973 |