Stable Spare Parts Pooling for Military Weapon Systems
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2018
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| _version_ | 1866910862862712832 |
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| author | Schlicher, Loe Slikker, Marco van Jaarsveld, Willem |
| author_facet | Schlicher, Loe Slikker, Marco van Jaarsveld, Willem |
| contents | We study under which circumstances Departments of Defenses should be willing to deploy a joint parts part pooling program for their major weapon systems. Using cooperative game theory and Markov Decision Processes, we demonstrate that the type of pooling strategy plays a crucial role in the success of such a joint spare parts pool. More precisely, we show that a joint spare parts pool may not last long -- or even not arise -- if full pooling is applied, while it is stable under threshold pooling. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1811_08145 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Stable Spare Parts Pooling for Military Weapon Systems Schlicher, Loe Slikker, Marco van Jaarsveld, Willem Optimization and Control We study under which circumstances Departments of Defenses should be willing to deploy a joint parts part pooling program for their major weapon systems. Using cooperative game theory and Markov Decision Processes, we demonstrate that the type of pooling strategy plays a crucial role in the success of such a joint spare parts pool. More precisely, we show that a joint spare parts pool may not last long -- or even not arise -- if full pooling is applied, while it is stable under threshold pooling. |
| title | Stable Spare Parts Pooling for Military Weapon Systems |
| topic | Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.08145 |