Bayesian Elicitation
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2019
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| _version_ | 1866910319118385152 |
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| author | Whitmeyer, Mark |
| author_facet | Whitmeyer, Mark |
| contents | We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. In a large class of binary-action games, opacity design is just as good as full commitment to actions and also guarantees that ex ante information acquisition always benefits the receiver, even though without opacity design this learning might actually lower the receiver's expected payoff. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1902_00976 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Bayesian Elicitation Whitmeyer, Mark Theoretical Economics We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. In a large class of binary-action games, opacity design is just as good as full commitment to actions and also guarantees that ex ante information acquisition always benefits the receiver, even though without opacity design this learning might actually lower the receiver's expected payoff. |
| title | Bayesian Elicitation |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.00976 |