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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.07173 |
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| _version_ | 1866913187153051648 |
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| author | Bannikova, Marina Dery, Lihi Obraztsova, Svetlana Rabinovich, Zinovi Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. |
| author_facet | Bannikova, Marina Dery, Lihi Obraztsova, Svetlana Rabinovich, Zinovi Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. |
| contents | Committee decisions are complicated by a deadline, e.g., the next start of a budget, or the beginning of a semester. In committee hiring decisions, it may be that if no candidate is supported by a strong majority, the default is to hire no one - an option that may cost dearly. As a result, committee members might prefer to agree on a reasonable, if not necessarily the best, candidate, to avoid unfilled positions. In this paper, we propose a model for the above scenario - Consensus Under a Deadline (CUD)- based on a time-bounded iterative voting process. We provide convergence guarantees and an analysis of the quality of the final decision. An extensive experimental study demonstrates more subtle features of CUDs, e.g., the difference between two simple types of committee member behavior, lazy vs.~proactive voters. Finally, a user study examines the differences between the behavior of rational voting bots and real voters, concluding that it may often be best to have bots play on the voters' behalf. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1905_07173 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Reaching Consensus Under a Deadline Bannikova, Marina Dery, Lihi Obraztsova, Svetlana Rabinovich, Zinovi Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. Computers and Society Committee decisions are complicated by a deadline, e.g., the next start of a budget, or the beginning of a semester. In committee hiring decisions, it may be that if no candidate is supported by a strong majority, the default is to hire no one - an option that may cost dearly. As a result, committee members might prefer to agree on a reasonable, if not necessarily the best, candidate, to avoid unfilled positions. In this paper, we propose a model for the above scenario - Consensus Under a Deadline (CUD)- based on a time-bounded iterative voting process. We provide convergence guarantees and an analysis of the quality of the final decision. An extensive experimental study demonstrates more subtle features of CUDs, e.g., the difference between two simple types of committee member behavior, lazy vs.~proactive voters. Finally, a user study examines the differences between the behavior of rational voting bots and real voters, concluding that it may often be best to have bots play on the voters' behalf. |
| title | Reaching Consensus Under a Deadline |
| topic | Computers and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.07173 |