The method of Eneström and Phragmén for parliamentary elections by means of approval voting
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2019
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| _version_ | 1866916158912856064 |
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| author | Camps, Rosa Mora, Xavier Saumell, Laia |
| author_facet | Camps, Rosa Mora, Xavier Saumell, Laia |
| contents | We study a method for proportional representation that was proposed at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century by Gustav Eneström and Edvard Phragmén. Like Phragmén's better-known iterative minimax method, it is assumed that the voters express themselves by means of approval voting. In contrast to the iterative minimax method, however, here one starts by fixing a quota, i.e. the number of votes that give the right to a seat. As a matter of fact, the method of Eneström and Phragmén can be seen as an extension of the method of largest remainders from closed lists to open lists, or also as an adaptation of the single transferable vote to approval rather than preferential voting. The properties of this method are studied and compared with those of other methods of the same kind. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1907_10590 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The method of Eneström and Phragmén for parliamentary elections by means of approval voting Camps, Rosa Mora, Xavier Saumell, Laia Theoretical Economics We study a method for proportional representation that was proposed at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century by Gustav Eneström and Edvard Phragmén. Like Phragmén's better-known iterative minimax method, it is assumed that the voters express themselves by means of approval voting. In contrast to the iterative minimax method, however, here one starts by fixing a quota, i.e. the number of votes that give the right to a seat. As a matter of fact, the method of Eneström and Phragmén can be seen as an extension of the method of largest remainders from closed lists to open lists, or also as an adaptation of the single transferable vote to approval rather than preferential voting. The properties of this method are studied and compared with those of other methods of the same kind. |
| title | The method of Eneström and Phragmén for parliamentary elections by means of approval voting |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.10590 |