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Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Ball, Ian, Kattwinkel, Deniz
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2019
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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