Scoring Strategic Agents
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteur principal: | |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2019
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| Accès en ligne: | |
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| _version_ | 1866914797049610240 |
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| author | Ball, Ian |
| author_facet | Ball, Ian |
| contents | I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The sender prefers "higher" decisions, and she can distort each feature at a privately known cost. I characterize the scoring rule that maximizes decision accuracy. This rule underweights some features to deter sender distortion, and overweights other features so that the score is correct on average. The receiver prefers this scoring rule to full disclosure because it mitigates his commitment problem. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1909_01888 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Scoring Strategic Agents Ball, Ian Theoretical Economics I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The sender prefers "higher" decisions, and she can distort each feature at a privately known cost. I characterize the scoring rule that maximizes decision accuracy. This rule underweights some features to deter sender distortion, and overweights other features so that the score is correct on average. The receiver prefers this scoring rule to full disclosure because it mitigates his commitment problem. |
| title | Scoring Strategic Agents |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01888 |