Characterizing the interplay between information and strength in Blotto games
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2019
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| _version_ | 1866913816590155776 |
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| author | Paarporn, Keith Chandan, Rahul Alizadeh, Mahnoosh Marden, Jason R. |
| author_facet | Paarporn, Keith Chandan, Rahul Alizadeh, Mahnoosh Marden, Jason R. |
| contents | In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two players over a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to randomness. One of the two players knows the valuations with certainty. The other knows only a distribution on the battlefield realizations. However, the informed player has fewer resources to allocate. We characterize unique equilibrium payoffs in a two battlefield setup of the Colonel Blotto game. We then focus on a three battlefield setup in the General Lotto game, a popular variant of the Colonel Blotto game. We characterize the unique equilibrium payoffs and mixed equilibrium strategies. We quantify the value of information - the difference in equilibrium payoff between the asymmetric information game and complete information game. We find information strictly improves the informed player's performance guarantee. However, the magnitude of improvement varies with the informed player's strength as well as the game parameters. Our analysis highlights the interplay between strength and information in adversarial environments. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1909_03382 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Characterizing the interplay between information and strength in Blotto games Paarporn, Keith Chandan, Rahul Alizadeh, Mahnoosh Marden, Jason R. Computer Science and Game Theory Systems and Control Optimization and Control In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two players over a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to randomness. One of the two players knows the valuations with certainty. The other knows only a distribution on the battlefield realizations. However, the informed player has fewer resources to allocate. We characterize unique equilibrium payoffs in a two battlefield setup of the Colonel Blotto game. We then focus on a three battlefield setup in the General Lotto game, a popular variant of the Colonel Blotto game. We characterize the unique equilibrium payoffs and mixed equilibrium strategies. We quantify the value of information - the difference in equilibrium payoff between the asymmetric information game and complete information game. We find information strictly improves the informed player's performance guarantee. However, the magnitude of improvement varies with the informed player's strength as well as the game parameters. Our analysis highlights the interplay between strength and information in adversarial environments. |
| title | Characterizing the interplay between information and strength in Blotto games |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Systems and Control Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.03382 |