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Hauptverfasser: Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios, Malikopoulos, Andreas
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2019
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.13122
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author Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios
Malikopoulos, Andreas
author_facet Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios
Malikopoulos, Andreas
contents In this paper, we investigate the social resource allocation in an emerging mobility system consisting of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) using mechanism design. CAVs provide the most intriguing opportunity for enabling travelers to monitor mobility system conditions efficiently and make better decisions. However, this new reality will influence travelers' tendency-of-travel and might give rise to rebound effects, e.g., increased-vehicle-miles traveled. To tackle this phenomenon, we propose a mechanism design formulation that provides an efficient social resource allocation of travel time for all travelers. Our focus is on the socio-technical aspect of the problem, i.e., by designing appropriate socio-economic incentives, we seek to prevent potential rebound effects. In particular, we propose an economically inspired mechanism to influence the impact of the travelers' decision-making on the well-being of an emerging mobility system.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1909_13122
institution arXiv
publishDate 2019
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Social Resource Allocation in a Mobility System with Connected and Automated Vehicles: A Mechanism Design Problem
Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios
Malikopoulos, Andreas
Systems and Control
In this paper, we investigate the social resource allocation in an emerging mobility system consisting of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) using mechanism design. CAVs provide the most intriguing opportunity for enabling travelers to monitor mobility system conditions efficiently and make better decisions. However, this new reality will influence travelers' tendency-of-travel and might give rise to rebound effects, e.g., increased-vehicle-miles traveled. To tackle this phenomenon, we propose a mechanism design formulation that provides an efficient social resource allocation of travel time for all travelers. Our focus is on the socio-technical aspect of the problem, i.e., by designing appropriate socio-economic incentives, we seek to prevent potential rebound effects. In particular, we propose an economically inspired mechanism to influence the impact of the travelers' decision-making on the well-being of an emerging mobility system.
title Social Resource Allocation in a Mobility System with Connected and Automated Vehicles: A Mechanism Design Problem
topic Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.13122