Super-Nash Performance
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2019
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| _version_ | 1866908606038802432 |
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| author | Ismail, Mehmet S. |
| author_facet | Ismail, Mehmet S. |
| contents | In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super-Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only receives but also guarantees super-Nash payoffs under unilateral profitable deviations by others. Further, optimin generalizes Nash equilibrium in n-person constant-sum games and coincides with it when n=2. Finally, optimin is consistent with the direction of non-Nash deviations in games in which cooperation has been extensively studied. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_1912_00211 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Super-Nash Performance Ismail, Mehmet S. Theoretical Economics 91A10, 68T37 I.2.11; J.4 In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super-Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only receives but also guarantees super-Nash payoffs under unilateral profitable deviations by others. Further, optimin generalizes Nash equilibrium in n-person constant-sum games and coincides with it when n=2. Finally, optimin is consistent with the direction of non-Nash deviations in games in which cooperation has been extensively studied. |
| title | Super-Nash Performance |
| topic | Theoretical Economics 91A10, 68T37 I.2.11; J.4 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.00211 |