All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2020
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| _version_ | 1866911479711662080 |
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| author | Kang, Benjamin Unwin, James |
| author_facet | Kang, Benjamin Unwin, James |
| contents | In an auction each party bids a certain amount and the one which bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here we consider a number of alternative forfeits which might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2002_02599 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits Kang, Benjamin Unwin, James Theoretical Economics In an auction each party bids a certain amount and the one which bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here we consider a number of alternative forfeits which might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts. |
| title | All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.02599 |