Efficient and fair trading mechanisms on the full preference domain
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | Yu, Jingsheng, Zhang, Jun |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2020
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
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