Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2020
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| _version_ | 1866914128114745344 |
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| author | Root, Joseph Ahn, David S. |
| author_facet | Root, Joseph Ahn, David S. |
| contents | We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto efficient two-agent mechanism is a "local dictatorship." Every group strategy-proof N-agent mechanism has two-agent marginal mechanisms that are local dictatorships. These results yield new characterizations and unifying insights for known characterizations. We find all group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms for the roommates problem. We give a related result for multiple assignment. We prove the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and give a partial converse. We also apply our characterization to task allocation and network regulation problems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2006_06776 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms Root, Joseph Ahn, David S. Theoretical Economics We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto efficient two-agent mechanism is a "local dictatorship." Every group strategy-proof N-agent mechanism has two-agent marginal mechanisms that are local dictatorships. These results yield new characterizations and unifying insights for known characterizations. We find all group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms for the roommates problem. We give a related result for multiple assignment. We prove the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and give a partial converse. We also apply our characterization to task allocation and network regulation problems. |
| title | Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.06776 |