Formal Methods for An Iterated Volunteer's Dilemma
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2020
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| _version_ | 1866916961869365248 |
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| author | Dineen, Jacob Haque, A S M Ahsan-Ul Bielskas, Matthew |
| author_facet | Dineen, Jacob Haque, A S M Ahsan-Ul Bielskas, Matthew |
| contents | Game theory provides a framework for studying communication dynamics and emergent phenomena arising from rational agent interactions. We present a model framework for the Volunteer's Dilemma with four key contributions: (1) formulating it as a stochastic concurrent nn n-player game, (2) developing properties to verify model correctness and reachability, (3) constructing strategy synthesis graphs to identify optimal game trajectories, and (4) analyzing parameter correlations with expected local and global rewards over finite time horizons. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2008_12846 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Formal Methods for An Iterated Volunteer's Dilemma Dineen, Jacob Haque, A S M Ahsan-Ul Bielskas, Matthew Multiagent Systems Computer Science and Game Theory Game theory provides a framework for studying communication dynamics and emergent phenomena arising from rational agent interactions. We present a model framework for the Volunteer's Dilemma with four key contributions: (1) formulating it as a stochastic concurrent nn n-player game, (2) developing properties to verify model correctness and reachability, (3) constructing strategy synthesis graphs to identify optimal game trajectories, and (4) analyzing parameter correlations with expected local and global rewards over finite time horizons. |
| title | Formal Methods for An Iterated Volunteer's Dilemma |
| topic | Multiagent Systems Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.12846 |