MAC Address Anonymization for Crowd Counting
Fuente:
arXiv
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2020
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866911758645460992 |
|---|---|
| author | Determe, Jean-François Azzagnuni, Sophia Horlin, François De Doncker, Philippe |
| author_facet | Determe, Jean-François Azzagnuni, Sophia Horlin, François De Doncker, Philippe |
| contents | Research has shown that counting WiFi packets called probe requests (PRs) implicitly provides a proxy for the number of people in an area. In this paper, we discuss a crowd counting system involving WiFi sensors detecting PRs over the air, then extracting and anonymizing their media access control (MAC) addresses using a hash-based approach. This paper discusses an anonymization procedure and shows time-synchronization inaccuracies among sensors and hashing collision rates to be low enough to prevent anonymization from interfering with counting algorithms. In particular, we derive an approximation of the collision rate of uniformly distributed identifiers, with analytical error bounds. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2009_09876 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | MAC Address Anonymization for Crowd Counting Determe, Jean-François Azzagnuni, Sophia Horlin, François De Doncker, Philippe Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture Research has shown that counting WiFi packets called probe requests (PRs) implicitly provides a proxy for the number of people in an area. In this paper, we discuss a crowd counting system involving WiFi sensors detecting PRs over the air, then extracting and anonymizing their media access control (MAC) addresses using a hash-based approach. This paper discusses an anonymization procedure and shows time-synchronization inaccuracies among sensors and hashing collision rates to be low enough to prevent anonymization from interfering with counting algorithms. In particular, we derive an approximation of the collision rate of uniformly distributed identifiers, with analytical error bounds. |
| title | MAC Address Anonymization for Crowd Counting |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.09876 |