A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2020
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| _version_ | 1866917665799405568 |
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| author | Bonifacio, Agustin G. Inarra, Elena Neme, Pablo |
| author_facet | Bonifacio, Agustin G. Inarra, Elena Neme, Pablo |
| contents | Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a "reduced form" of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2009_11689 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games Bonifacio, Agustin G. Inarra, Elena Neme, Pablo Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a "reduced form" of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments. |
| title | A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.11689 |