Efficient allocation with ordinal preference intensities
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2020
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| _version_ | 1866908964401184768 |
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| author | Gerasimou, Georgios |
| author_facet | Gerasimou, Georgios |
| contents | Standard ordinal allocation methods ignore how strongly agents value different improvements, while cardinal methods require additional assumptions that are often considered too demanding. This paper studies assignment problems in the middle ground environment of *ordinal preference intensities* where agents can rank alternatives as well as preference improvements. The two criteria it proposes--*intensity-efficient* and *intensity-positional* allocations--use this combined information to refine Pareto efficiency via a novel dominance concept and a generalization of Borda-style scoring, respectively.These criteria point in new directions where stronger welfare gains are possible without cardinal utility or monetary transfers assumptions. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2011_04306 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Efficient allocation with ordinal preference intensities Gerasimou, Georgios Theoretical Economics Standard ordinal allocation methods ignore how strongly agents value different improvements, while cardinal methods require additional assumptions that are often considered too demanding. This paper studies assignment problems in the middle ground environment of *ordinal preference intensities* where agents can rank alternatives as well as preference improvements. The two criteria it proposes--*intensity-efficient* and *intensity-positional* allocations--use this combined information to refine Pareto efficiency via a novel dominance concept and a generalization of Borda-style scoring, respectively.These criteria point in new directions where stronger welfare gains are possible without cardinal utility or monetary transfers assumptions. |
| title | Efficient allocation with ordinal preference intensities |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.04306 |