Screening for breakthroughs
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2020
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| _version_ | 1866911305398484992 |
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| author | Curello, Gregorio Sinander, Ludvig |
| author_facet | Curello, Gregorio Sinander, Ludvig |
| contents | How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2011_10090 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Screening for breakthroughs Curello, Gregorio Sinander, Ludvig Theoretical Economics How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes. |
| title | Screening for breakthroughs |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.10090 |