Weak versus deterministic macroscopic realism, and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen's elements of reality

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Fulton, Jesse, Thenabadu, M., Teh, Run Yan, Reid, M. D.
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2021
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author Fulton, Jesse
Thenabadu, M.
Teh, Run Yan
Reid, M. D.
author_facet Fulton, Jesse
Thenabadu, M.
Teh, Run Yan
Reid, M. D.
contents Violation of Leggett-Garg inequalities allows proof of the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and the combined premises (called macrorealism) of macroscopic realism (MR) and non-invasive measurability (NIM). Arguments can be given that the incompatibility arises because MR fails $-$ or else, that NIM fails. In this paper, we consider a strong failure of macrorealism, involving superpositions of coherent states, where the NIM premise is replaced by Bell-locality. We follow recent work and propose validity of a subset of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) and Leggett-Garg premises, referred to as \emph{weak macroscopic realism} (wMR). In finding consistency with wMR, we identify that the Leggett-Garg inequalities are violated because of failure of both MR and NIM, but also that both are valid in a less restrictive sense. Weak MR is distinguished from \emph{deterministic macroscopic realism} (dMR) by recognizing that a measurement involves a reversible unitary interaction that establishes the measurement setting. Weak MR posits a predetermined value for the measurement outcome, for the system defined at the time after the interaction, when the measurement setting is experimentally specified. An extended definition of wMR considers the element of reality defined by EPR for a system A, where one can predict with certainty the outcome of a measurement on A, by measurement on a system B. Weak MR posits that the element of reality exists once the unitary interaction determining the setting at B has occurred. We show compatibility of systems violating Leggett-Garg inequalities with wMR, but point out that dMR is falsifiable. We compare with other MR models, and give an argument for wMR on the basis that wMR resolves inconsistencies pointed out by Leggett and Garg between failure of macrorealism and assumptions intrinsic to quantum measurement theory.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2101_09476
institution arXiv
publishDate 2021
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Weak versus deterministic macroscopic realism, and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen's elements of reality
Fulton, Jesse
Thenabadu, M.
Teh, Run Yan
Reid, M. D.
Quantum Physics
Violation of Leggett-Garg inequalities allows proof of the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and the combined premises (called macrorealism) of macroscopic realism (MR) and non-invasive measurability (NIM). Arguments can be given that the incompatibility arises because MR fails $-$ or else, that NIM fails. In this paper, we consider a strong failure of macrorealism, involving superpositions of coherent states, where the NIM premise is replaced by Bell-locality. We follow recent work and propose validity of a subset of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) and Leggett-Garg premises, referred to as \emph{weak macroscopic realism} (wMR). In finding consistency with wMR, we identify that the Leggett-Garg inequalities are violated because of failure of both MR and NIM, but also that both are valid in a less restrictive sense. Weak MR is distinguished from \emph{deterministic macroscopic realism} (dMR) by recognizing that a measurement involves a reversible unitary interaction that establishes the measurement setting. Weak MR posits a predetermined value for the measurement outcome, for the system defined at the time after the interaction, when the measurement setting is experimentally specified. An extended definition of wMR considers the element of reality defined by EPR for a system A, where one can predict with certainty the outcome of a measurement on A, by measurement on a system B. Weak MR posits that the element of reality exists once the unitary interaction determining the setting at B has occurred. We show compatibility of systems violating Leggett-Garg inequalities with wMR, but point out that dMR is falsifiable. We compare with other MR models, and give an argument for wMR on the basis that wMR resolves inconsistencies pointed out by Leggett and Garg between failure of macrorealism and assumptions intrinsic to quantum measurement theory.
title Weak versus deterministic macroscopic realism, and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen's elements of reality
topic Quantum Physics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.09476